Debate on Bernard Yack’s book nationalism and the moral psychology of community by HEARN, Jonathan et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
6-2014
Debate on Bernard Yack’s book nationalism and the
moral psychology of community
Jonathan HEARN
Chandran KUKATHAS




Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Models and Methods Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HEARN, Jonathan, KUKATHAS, Chandran, MILLER, David, & YACK, Bernard.(2014). Debate on Bernard Yack’s book nationalism
and the moral psychology of community. Nations and Nationalism, 20(3), 395-414.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2918
Debate on Bernard Yack’s book
Nationalism and the Moral Psychology
of Community
JONATHAN HEARN,* CHANDRAN KUKATHAS,**
DAVID MILLER,*** and BERNARD YACK****
*Sociology, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh,
UK
**Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, UK
***Department of Politics, Brandeis University, USA
****Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political
Science, UK
Jonathan Hearn (chair): Opening Remarks
Bernard Yack’s Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community (2012)
was the subject of the eighth in a long-running series of debates hosted by the
Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) and the
journal Nations and Nationalism in November of 2013. These debates bring
together the authors of recent important works in the study of nationalism and
ethnicity with appropriate scholars to explore the questions they have pro-
voked. On this occasion Professor Yack was joined by Professor Chandran
Kukathas and Professor David Miller.
Chandran Kukathas holds a Chair in Political Theory in the Department of
Government at the London School of Economics. His work addresses the
history of liberal thought, contemporary liberal theory and issues of multicul-
turalism. He has examined the work of John Rawls and F. A. Hayek, and
advances his own justification of liberalism and multiculturalism in The Liberal
Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford) (Kukathas 2003), in
which he argues that the looser image of the ‘archipelago’ is a more fitting
metaphor for this form of society than ‘the body politic’ or the ‘ship of state’.
David Miller is Professor of Political Theory, Politics and International
Relations, at Nuffield College, Oxford. His writing on political theory has
been particularly concerned with issues of justice and equality, and the themes
of nationality, citizenship, territory and immigration. A distinguishing feature
of his work is the use of evidence from the social sciences to inform debates in
political philosophy. Recent work has been particularly concerned with global
and social justice, and problems of collective responsibility. He recently pub-
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Bernard Yack is Lerman-Neubauer Professor of Democracy and Public
Policy in the Department of Politics at Brandeis University. He works on
political theory and the history of political thought, and has been increasingly
concerned with questions of nationalism and cultural pluralism. Our aliena-
tions from, and understandings of, ‘modernity’ are the respective key themes
of his books The Longing for Total Revolution (Yack 1986) and The Fetishism
of Modernities (Yack 1997). The book that is the subject of the present debate,
Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community (Yack 2012), takes
further some of the ideas developed previously in The Problems of a Political
Animal: Community, Conflict, and Justice in Aristotelian Political Thought
(Yack 1993). He has also edited a volume of essays, Liberalism Without Illu-
sions (Yack 1996), on the work of the late Judith Shklar, who was his PhD
supervisor.
The main argument of Nationalism and theMoral Psychology of Community
is that to understand nationalism and its hold on people’s minds we need to
understand it as composed of two things: a sense of community, and the idea
of popular sovereignty. For Yack national community arises out of a shared
heritage of experiences, which can have quite diverse bases, and associated
feelings of what he calls ‘social friendship’, meaning genuine mutual concern,
not just abstract obligation. Thus he formulates a very open and flexible
conception of community – highly contingent and variable in its origins, but
nonetheless ‘fateful’ in how it circumscribes political possibilities. Central to
his concern here is to break with the idea of community as somehow ‘tradi-
tional’, an aspect of our lost past, or something to be recovered in a utopian
future. National community in his terms is a present reality.
After developing his conception of modern national community, the latter
half of the book grapples with the consequences of the idea of popular sover-
eignty, which he sees, fairly conventionally, as a theory of political legitimacy
that arises in the eighteenth century. Modern nationalism takes shape when
patterns of national community are variously drawn into the new politics of
sovereignty. Two general conclusions arise out of his argument. On the one
hand, we should not condemn national sentiments or assume that we can
easily transcend a nationally organised world. Yack expresses scepticism
towards cosmopolitan ‘solutions’ to nationalism and national identity. On the
other hand, this general condition will lead to intractable conflicts if we assume
that concordance between territory, community and sovereignty can always be
achieved. Moreover, when national interest, solidarity and a sense of injustice
become strongly aligned, we are prone to a certain moral blindness, easily
losing sight of our basic moral respect for and recognition of those outside the
national community, with whom ‘our’ group has come into conflict. In sum,
we need to be prepared to compromise and moderate our national sentiments,
but we must also ‘learn to live with nationalism’.
In keeping with Yack’s style of thought, the book’s argument does not offer
‘solutions’ or attempt to replace one theory with another. Rather, it offers a
more nuanced assessment of ‘the problem’, and includes many interesting and
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rewarding by-ways and auxiliary arguments along the way, that have not been
summarised here. In what follows, Professors Kukathas and Miller offer criti-
cal engagements with Yack’s argument.
Comment by Chandran Kukathas
Nationalism was supposed to have gone away, yet persists, and is perhaps
growing, as a major force in the world. Attitudes to it have ranged from
despair at the inability of human beings to shake off the primitive tribal
attachments that lie at the source of group conflict, to contempt for the
susceptibility of people to this destructive ideology, to an aspiration to recon-
ceive national loyalty in civic terms such that the old reality of attachment to
particular groups is transmuted into a new reality of commitment to a com-
munity of citizens. Bernard Yack has shown convincingly that these under-
standings of nationalism, and the consequent attempts to address the
problems that nationalist sentiment pose, are inadequate. We need a better
understanding of what nationalism is, as well as a more sophisticated
approach to dealing with it theoretically and institutionally.
Professor Yack has given us a much clearer picture of the nature of nation-
alism, but I am not sure he has supplied us with the best answer to the problem
of how to deal with the reality of group attachment. The problem lies in the
original aspiration: Yack’s commitment to ‘the liberal project of rendering
coercive authority accountable to the people who created it’ (Yack 2012: 17).
His view is that liberals have failed to tell a convincing story that recognises the
particular attachments human beings have and that at the same time explains
how they can see themselves as also part of a larger whole that exercises power
over them. They have failed, first, because they have failed to appreciate the
importance of communal sentiment – because they have not understood the
moral psychology of community – and second, because they have been dis-
tracted by a wrong moral theory, and have therefore pursued poor institu-
tional remedies – trying either to foster self-determination or suppress
difference. He thinks we can tell a better story, and come up with better
institutions. While he has presented us with a very sophisticated and illumi-
nating analysis, and I am substantially in agreement with it, I am not sure he
has the moral psychology entirely right inasmuch as he may have overstated
the importance of understanding it, and have some doubts about the institu-
tional lessons he draws. I suspect that the source of the problem is the failure
to question the liberal project itself.
Let me start with the moral psychology. Yack wishes to reject two myths:
the myths of ethnic and civic nationalism. The first tries to assimilate the
nation to a natural community, suggesting that peoples are distinctive or at
the extreme even autochthonous – as if they had sprung from the earth or the
lands they inhabit. The second tries to present the national community as a
chosen community, making nationhood something we construct for our own
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purposes. Yet community is something that is neither wholly natural nor
entirely artificial but something in-between. We can shape and transform
communities, but not easily or at will. We come into the world as members of
communities and grow up with attachments to them; our moral life is sub-
stantially a product of our communal life. We are capable of developing
intense communal loyalties but also of stepping back and reviewing our com-
mitments, particularly to the extent that we are members of different commu-
nities and recognise each as a partial community. The good of community is
thus something we should neither overrate nor despise. Nationalism, then, is
more than just a strong attachment to one’s nation and its members but the
result of the working of more complex forces. It gets its impetus from our
capacity for communal loyalty or attachment, but is given shape by beliefs we
acquire about political legitimacy. It is not just a matter of loyalty to a group;
but neither is it something that can be created among people who lack that
sensibility or feeling of attachment (Yack 2012: 158).
This seems to me to be substantially correct, and indeed very illuminating.
From this analysis Yack goes on to argue that the moral problem with nation-
alism arises out of the ‘intensification of communal hostility inspired by this
convergence of sentiment and conviction, rather than from the intrinsic limi-
tations of either communal loyalty or popular sovereignty’ (Yack 2012: 158).
The problem is not our ‘disposition to form contingent communities like the
nation’ but the propensity to become hostile to other communities when
national sentiment strengthens.
Yet the obvious questions to ask are why such sentiments should develop in
this way and why this should inspire communal hostility? The thought seems
to be that the greater the sense of group loyalty the more powerful must
become the antipathy towards other groups. But must it be this way? And if it
must, what is driving this development? What is missing in Yack’s analysis is
an answer to these questions and much turns on this. If the answer is that what
inspires communal hostility is just the growth of national sentiment it is hard
to see what exactly that answer is telling us. To fill the explanatory gap I
suggest we must recognise the role of particular actors – political elites – in this
process. For national sentiment is not something that springs spontaneously
from the community but is rather something that is provoked into existence by
particular actors who have something to gain by generating it.
Communal memberships, as Yack has recognised, are partial memberships
to the extent that people belong to different groups or communities. Not all
attachments we have are of equal importance but the salience of one or
another is not given by the nature of the group or community as such but by
the circumstances that shape beliefs. For example, in the interwar years many
Jews saw themselves as Germans first and Jews second, but after the war this
changed dramatically. One important cause shaping communal loyalty or
attachment is the efforts of political elites to create a sense of commitment to
a particular community. Such elites might not only create the sense of com-
mitment (though success is never guaranteed) but also create the community to
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the extent that it defines and gives intellectual substance to the group it
identifies. The efforts of Shiv Sena, the Hindu nationalist political movement
created by Bal Thackeray in 1966, is an example of this. None of this is to
suggest that anyone could create communal loyalty to anything. What marks
the skillful political activist is the ability to discern which sensitivities to
highlight and exploit in pursuit of an agenda. But the efforts of such actors are
important if communal identities and loyalties are to emerge or intensify.
The reason this is important is that Yack’s analysis of the moral psychology
of community is the basis for an explanation of the relations between groups,
and the thought seems to be that the psychology explaining commitment or
attachment is important for our understanding for why there might be differ-
ing commitments that lead ultimately to conflict between groups – or lead to
conflict between national minorities and the states in which they are embed-
ded. But is it the case that in such instances the conflicts that arise are the result
of differences between collectives themselves rather than the product of the
political activity of particular elites who mobilise groups in order to secure
their own ends? This is not to deny the reality of group-based difference or the
fact of antipathy between peoples, but it is to question the importance of group
attachment or loyalty as an explanation of inter-group relations or group
conflict.
I raise this in part because I am struck by how often political theorists allude
to the problem of group conflict in an effort to explain the function of political
institutions, which are established in order to remedy a pre-political problem.
The most commonly invoked example, also mentioned by Yack, is that of the
so-called ‘wars of religion’ in 16th century Europe. The standard argument in
political theory is that this was a period of religious conflict among states
divided on matters of doctrine, and that peace was secured by the establish-
ment of the modern state as a secular political institution. What is missing
from this analysis is an appreciation of the fact that conflicts in question in the
16th century were not religious conflicts between warring Protestant and
Catholic sects but political conflicts between republics, principalities, and
kingdoms contending with one another and with larger states as well as with
powerful actors within the Holy Roman Empire. Warring factions were
divided not along religious lines but political ones, since some Catholic princes
fought other Catholic princes, and some Protestant rulers allied with Catholic
ones to combat other Protestant rulers. These were not wars of religion but
wars among religious entities in a world in which everyone was religious. There
did exist religious disagreements, and there was religious persecution; but this
does not mean that the conflicts were the product of differences of religious
conviction among the peoples of Europe rather than the political ambitions of
rulers looking to gain territory or consolidate their hold on power. I don’t
think we would understand these conflicts better if we tried to get a better
grasp of the moral psychology of religious commitment.
When it comes to national or ethnic conflict I think a very similar story
could be told. Ethnic groups and nations have coexisted peacefully in some
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circumstances and entered into bitter and bloody conflicts in others. The
question is why the difference. The answer cannot lie in a better understanding
of the nature of ethnic or national attachments, since that is what is constant.
The answer has to look more closely at the way in which ethnic identities are
created or consolidated and national sentiments intensified.
Where Yack is right to address the problem of understanding the moral
psychology of community in trying to understand nationalism is in his effort to
answer or criticise those who think that nationalism can be dismissed as an
irrational attachment, or overcome by the establishment of a civic identity. But
a fuller understanding of the phenomenon needs a greater emphasis on its
roots in political affairs.
Let me turn then to what Yack has to say about the way in which we
should respond to nationalism institutionally. There are two positions he
rejects: one that panders to nationalism by pushing for national self-
determination, and a second that hopes to wash it away by creating cosmo-
politan democracies. I will focus on his critique of the cosmopolitan
alternative since it forms the basis of his own institutional recommendations.
The cosmopolitan democrat comes in two varieties, one vulgar and the other
sophisticated. The vulgar cosmopolitan simply envisages the dereliction of
national sovereignty, which will simply disappear as a force in the world. But
the sophisticated cosmopolitan is one who sees it rather as an ineffective
means of dealing with the problems of the modern world, though one that
persists nonetheless. Both see the national sovereign state as something that
has had its day. Yack’s view is that the principle of popular sovereignty is
the principle that lies at the heart of the modern understanding of political
legitimacy. As commitment to or belief in this principle has spread, our
understanding of political community has been nationalised as we have come
to regard the community as defined or shaped by peoples who share some
common identity, and our understanding of nationality has been politicised
as the people must exercise its power to legitimise authority. Nationalism
and popular sovereignty go hand in hand, and that means that nationalism
is not going to go away anytime soon.
The worry, however, is that sovereign states acting with the authority of a
people can also exercise tyrannical power over their subjects. And the more
secure it is as the authority instituted by the people the more dangerous it can
be. Such a state would be troubling because there might be no area into which
it could not reach to legislate since it is autonomous once authorised by the
people. It would also be troubling because if it is authorised by the collective
there are no rivals to challenge its exercise of power. The nation state could
turn out to be an unlimited and oppressive one. Yack articulates this worry in
order to meet it head on, but concludes that the problem is manageable under
liberal democracy if we have a proper appreciation of the virtues of structures
of internal sovereignty. States need not be understood as Hobbesian or
Bodinian sovereigns, unlimited and undivided in their authority. They can be
both limited and divided.
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To explain how this might be possible, Yack turns to John Locke. The
worry that Hobbes and Bodin addressed was that if the arbitrariness of
authority were checked by the medieval mechanisms of independent and plural
centres of power, individuals would simply be subject to the goodwill of
notables, even if this did provide individuals with refuge from the power of the
state. Internal sovereignty was dangerous. But Locke solves this problem by
dividing authority: vesting sovereign authority in the people as a whole, and
giving coercive – legislative and executive – authority in the structure of
political institutions. Modern liberal states, Yack argues, have adopted this
division in their political institutional arrangements and thereby tamed abso-
lutism to supply limited government. Constitutional government has given us
the best of all possible worlds.
My worry here, however, is that Yack is too sanguine about the success of
modern constitutional states as institutions of limited government. What he
has tried to do is to revise our understanding of community to present nation-
alism and popular sovereignty as working together to underpin legitimate
authority. Liberalism and nationalism might be in tension, but in the end the
modern nation state can work to fulfill liberalism. Yet here much turns on
judgments about the nature of the modern state and the extent of our success
in preserving limited government – on judgments of how benign such states
really are. I think there are substantial grounds for scepticism if one considers
the extent of the modern state’s capacity to monitor its citizens and control its
borders. Not even the absolutist states of early modernity could establish a
direct relationship with every individual within its borders in the way the
developed states of today can. Today we take for granted something which
once would have been considered astonishing: that states have the right ‘to a
monopoly of all the force within the community, to make war, to make peace,
to conscript life, to tax, to establish and dis-establish property, to define crime,
to punish disobedience, to control education, to supervise the family, to regu-
late personal habits, and to censor opinions.’ (Lippman, cited in Cavanaugh
2011: 28).
If Yack is right, the modern constitutional state can deal quite well with
nationalism because it relies upon the development of national sentiment to
secure its own foundations, and by structuring itself appropriately it is able to
limit the power of particular groups or communities. The problem that arises
here, however, is that a unitary state cannot be limited, for there are no forces
to oppose it. As the English pluralists recognised, a limited state could only
exist ‘where social space was complexly refracted into a network of associa-
tions, that is, where associations were not ‘intermediate associations’, squeezed
between state and individual, at all.’ (Cavanaugh 2011: 32) It would not do to
subject the diversity of publics (that existed where there once was a network of
communities) to the authority of a single sovereign will. To the extent that
such a will is asserted and its legitimacy is insisted upon, what is bound to
happen is the some part of the whole will establish its dominance over the
entirety.
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The success of Yack’s conceiving of the nation as a kind of community that
can be given expression in the modern liberal democratic state may be that it
describes accurately what has emerged in the world in which we live. But I am
not sure that the story it tells is altogether reassuring.
Comment by David Miller
It is a great pleasure to be asked to comment on Bernard Yack’s fine book,
from which I have learned a great deal. It is a wonderful example of deep
scholarship lightly worn: it is an ocean away from those depressingly familiar
books in which each sentence seems to have a Harvard-style reference at the
end while containing a clumsy paraphrase of the cited author’s thought. The
book poses a particularly strong challenge to those like myself who have
defended the position that has come to be labelled ‘liberal nationalism’. It is
particularly strong because it is mounted from a position close by, so it comes
near to being an internal critique. Unlike liberal cosmopolitans, for instance,
Yack accept the value of belonging to a national community; he accepts that
it is reasonable to display national loyalty and national partiality; he does not
look forward to a bright new future where nations have withered away and
everyone has become a citizen of the world – a condition that Isaiah Berlin
once described as ‘a tremendous dessication of everything that is human’.
(Gardels 1991: 22) Nevertheless Yack is worried about nationalism, under-
stood as an attempt to make nation and territorial state coincide, geographi-
cally. He is insistent that ‘nation’ and ‘people’ – the latter understood as the set
of persons who are subject to the authority of a state, and more recently
regarded as the ultimate holders of sovereignty – must be kept separate. If
nationalism is ‘morally problematic’ as he puts it, then a fortiori this must also
apply to liberal forms of nationalism. Can one then be both a nationalist and
a liberal? Or is nationalism always liable to lead to outcomes that liberals will
find abhorrent – ethnic cleansing for example? That’s the main challenge that
Yack’s book poses for people like me.
I shall concentrate my remarks in two main areas. First I shall discuss
Yack’s concept of ‘nation’ and the way in which he tries to remove from it
those political elements that give rise to nationalism. Second I shall address the
issue of territory, and Yack’s attempt to drive a wedge between nation and
territory, as he argues against national self-determination as a political ideal.
A nation, according to Yack, is a community of people who feel a special
concern for one another, and who are picked out from the rest of humanity by
virtue of sharing a cultural heritage. What makes up this heritage is quite
variable: Yack mentions ‘language, relics, symbols, stories of origin, memories
of traumatic experiences, and so on’ (Yack 2012: 69). He also emphasises that
each person can pick and choose among the items that go into this heritage,
adopting some elements but rejecting others. I shall come back to this selec-
tivity in a moment, but first let us ask what it means to share a cultural
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inheritance, as a criterion of group membership. This is less straightforward
than it might at first appear. I can bring this out by considering Yack’s own
example of the American in Paris. This woman
may know more about French history than a particular native, she may even speak a
purer French; but that does not make her a member of the French nation if she
developed her facility in French culture in the course she chose to take at American
universities (Yack 2012: 84)
According to Yack, this woman knows the French cultural heritage, but does
not share it. But what does that mean? What disqualifies her from being a
sharer? As far as I can see there are three possibilities, none of them helpful to
Yack’s position.
1. The woman, though immersed in French culture, remains an American
citizen. Her political loyalties are still with the US. But Yack wants to draw
a clear distinction between nationality and political citizenship. So, on his
account it cannot be her lack of French citizenship that prevents her from
being included in the French nation.
2. The woman acquired her French culture in the wrong place; Yack says she
studied French at American universities, and was presumably brought up
there. But this gives us a territorial conception of nationality: a person
shares a cultural inheritance (in the relevant sense) if and only if they were
born and raised in the territory associated with that culture. But Yack as I
noted earlier (and I will come back to this later) wants to draw a line
between nation and territory. Although ideas of homeland may be included
in a nation’s cultural heritage, territorial location does not define a nation.
So, our woman cannot be excluded from French nationality just because
she was raised in the US.
3. The woman does not identify herself as French. Although she loves French
culture and is better versed in it than many natives, she still thinks of herself
as an American abroad. Well that sounds right, but then there must be
something more to her identity than the sharing of a cultural inheritance.
Because in the most obvious sense of the word she does share in that
inheritance. When she meets with French people she can discourse with
them, in her perfect French, about the relative merits of Camus and Sartre,
about the importance of remembering St Bartholomew’s Day, in case they
should have forgotten, and so forth. So the missing element cannot be the
cultural inheritance itself, but the way in which she regards it, and the way
that others would regard her participation in it.
Pursuing point 3, what exactly is missing here? Surely the fact that the woman
we are considering does not regard herself as engaged in any kind of political
project to protect and develop those elements of French culture that she
happens to know and admire. What is lacking is precisely the political dimen-
sion to nationality that Yack wants to exclude. She has no interest in acquiring
French citizenship, except merely as a convenient way of extending her stay in
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Paris. If she instead acquires it because she wants to become involved politi-
cally – perhaps she wants to protest against Qataris buying up Impressionist
art – she is well on the road to becoming French, in the national sense. It is not
the legal status of citizenship that matters – I agree with Yack about that – but
the use to which it is put.1
My first point, then, is that although co-nationals do indeed share in a
cultural heritage, the fact of sharing by itself is not enough to distinguish them
from others. What is missing is a certain practical stance towards that heritage,
namely a collective commitment to protect and extend it into the future.
My second point will be about the picking and mixing. Are we as free as
Yack suggests to choose the attitudes we adopt towards different elements in
the cultural array we inherit? According to Yack:
It is the affirmation of a shared cultural heritage as a source of mutual concern and
loyalty that makes a national community, rather than the sharing of any particular
beliefs, practices, or institutions. In a nation we share, to use Renan’s expression, a rich
“legacy of memories” and other cultural artifacts, regardless of whether or not we are
inclined to employ or celebrate the contents of that legacy (Yack 2012: 74).
This of course is helpful if one wants to show that national membership
involves no breach of liberal principles. You can be as critical as you like of the
contents of your national heritage, and still remain a fully paid-up member of
the nation.
But is that really so? Doesn’t it depend on which parts of the cultural
heritage we are considering? Yack’s position makes good sense if we are
thinking about, for example, national sports. We can recognise that baseball is
the national sport of Americans, hockey of Canadians, cricket of the English,
and so forth, from within these communities without adopting any particular
attitude towards the sport itself. I might find cricket a dull and stupid game (I
don’t) while recognising that it forms part of my cultural heritage as an
Englishman. But is that true of all the elements that make up the heritage in
question? What about, in particular, defining historical events, such as the
American Revolution or World War II? First it seems hard to deny that as a
member of the relevant nations you must believe in the significance of these
events – you must agree that they are indeed defining events. And second it
seems that you have to adopt a particular stance towards them, or at least a
stance that falls within a relatively limited range. For example, if you are an
American, you have to believe that the Revolution was justified, and that it
was the moment that gave birth to a new nation as the shackles of colonial rule
were thrown off. Rival views, such that it was really the first American Civil
War between rival factions inside the country, fall outside the permissible
range. Or a Briton looking back at World War II must think it a matter of
national pride that in 1940 Britain stood alone against the onslaught from
Hitler’s Germany. The alternative view, put forward at the time by Lord
Halifax and his supporters, that the prudent course was for Britain to nego-
tiate a peace settlement with Hitler, is again outside of the range.2
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To be clear, when I say that certain views are impermissible to hold, I don’t
mean that people should be prevented from expressing them – far from it. If
someone wants to defend Halifax by laying out a counterfactual history in
which Hitler’s ambitions are held in check by a peace settlement, he is perfectly
entitled to do so. Liberal rights of freedom of thought and expression are not
at issue. The point is rather that for a nation to exist there must be a broad
consensus on certain key questions. Somebody who holds a contrary view on
one or more of these issues to that extent renounces their national identity.
Moreover it is legitimate for elements of the consensus to be handed on
inter-generationally through formal education and in other ways. So a liberal
who thinks that it is positively desirable for everything to be challenged and for
as many conflicting opinions as possible to be expressed may find the existence
of nations an impediment to her wish. A liberal nationalist, then, is a particular
kind of liberal, one who appreciates the truth of a remark of Tocqueville’s that
I cited as an epigraph to On Nationality:
In order that society should exist and, a fortiori, that a society should prosper, it is
necessary that the minds of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain
predominant ideas; and this cannot be the case unless each of them sometimes draws his
opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of belief
already formed (de Tocqueville 1945: 9).
I turn finally to the issue of territory, and Yack’s claim that nations are not in
essence territorial groups. Territorial issues only arise, he claims, when the idea
of national self-determination appears on the scene, for this is understood to
involve the nation as holding exclusive rights over the territory that it regards
as its own. This immediately opens the door to conflict, since nations inter-
mingle with one another on the ground and their ideas of the nation’s home-
land overlap. Indeed, Yack says, national self-determination as it is commonly
understood involves an inner contradiction, for the attempt to make the
borders of states line up with national boundaries clashes with the idea of
popular sovereignty, which is the claim of all those who permanently reside in
a territory to act as the source of the authority that governs it. Either you start
with nations as subjectively defined groups, or you start with politically-
defined territories and those who de facto live in them, but you cannot start
from both at once.
This is a powerful challenge, borne out in the eyes of many by the often
intractable territorial conflicts that persist in the world today, but I want to
meet it first by casting a critical eye on Yack’s claim that ‘the same or over-
lapping lands can belong to more than one nation, since the members of
national communities not only dwell frequently side by side in the same
territories, but can also recall the same sites of past greatness and trauma’
(Yack 2012: 91). Here we need first to disentangle the claim about residence
from the claim about historical memory. Cases in which members of two
distinct nations are intermingled throughout a territory seem to me to be quite
rare, if we discount cases in which populations have been deliberately moved
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to cement political conquests, as happened in the case of Russian immigrants
sent to the Baltic states following World War II and more recently with the
Han Chinese and Tibet. Much more commonly we find large areas overwhelm-
ingly occupied by members of two (or occasionally more than two) distinct
nations, and then a borderland area in which national identities are mixed. The
borderlands are disputed, but neither nation makes territorial claims to the
whole of the other’s territory. Indeed the only case I can think of in which there
is an across-the-board dispute between rival groups claiming the whole of a
territory in which their members live is Israel-Palestine. Now ‘debatable lands’
are certainly hard cases for the principle of national self-determination, and
the conflicts they create may require ingenious solutions that give each side
partial self-determination through an elaborate power-sharing arrangement.3
But even they do not quite match Yack’s description.
What next about ‘sites of past greatness and trauma’? That these play a
large role in national memory is not in doubt. But in most cases there will be
a clear distinction between sites that fall within the national homeland and
those that do not. In 2014 hundreds of thousands of visitors from Britain,
Germany, France and other places further afield are expected to descend on
the city of Mons to recall one of the most traumatic battles of World War I.
But nobody supposes for a moment that Mons properly belongs to anything
other than the territory of Belgium. Any country with an imperial past will
contain in its collective memory significant events that happened outside of the
homeland, without believing that it retains any territorial claim to the places
where they occurred. Do Turks who recall what happened in 1683 still think
that they have any residual claim to Vienna: surely not? Indeed one effect of
the consolidation of national territory is to draw a sharp line between home-
land proper and what we might call the theatre of national history, which may
indeed have a wide stage. So the difficult cases will be ones where homelands
remain in dispute for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. Yack cites
the example of Kosovo, but the point about Kosovo is that it is not just a ‘site
of past greatness and trauma’ for the Serbs, but also an area in which Serbian
and Albanian populations remained intermingled until very recently (indeed
still do to some extent). In the great majority of instances nations can happily
‘share’ historic sites because only one of them at most still regards the place as
belonging to their national territory.
Even if reflection on these cases convinces the reader that national self-
determination and popular sovereignty do not collide as sharply as Yack
(2012: 244–8) suggests, it might still be said that there is a conflict of principle.
Popular sovereignty requires that since ‘the people’ are defined as those who
inhabit a given territory with fixed boundaries, these boundaries must be
treated as sacrosanct; whereas the national principle tells us to redraw them
wherever this better serves the cause of national self-determination. But does
popular sovereignty actually prohibit boundary redrawing? Was it a violation
of popular sovereignty when the two halves of Germany reunited, or the two
halves of Czechoslovakia split? If the demos votes to reconstitute itself in one
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or other of these ways, why is this not an exercise of popular sovereignty rather
than its negation?
There is a further point worth adding here, though I cannot develop it
fully.4 If popular sovereignty is to have more than merely formal content – if
it means that the people should exercise real democratic control over their
government – then the composition of the people and not merely its geographic
location will matter. The claim of (liberal) nationalists is that democracy
works best when its constituents overwhelmingly share a national identity, for
reasons having to do with the presence of trust, and the need to reach political
agreements that all can accept. Despite the oft-repeated claim that there is no
democratic way of deciding where the boundaries of the demos should fall,
there may then be democratic reasons for drawing political borders in such a
way that they correspond to national boundaries wherever possible, and exer-
cising ingenuity in the small number of instances where this cannot be made to
work. If this is true, then the relation between national self-determination and
popular sovereignty may be one of mutual support, and not the mutual
undermining that Yack asserts.
Notes
1 One corollary of the conception of ‘nation’ that Yack adopts is that the nation/ethnic group
distinction evaporates. Yack concedes this: ‘in the end, nation and ethnos (or ethnie) are two words
for a single form of association: an intergenerational community based on the affirmation of a
shared cultural inheritance’ (93).
2 I don’t mean to suggest that these points of reference are set in stone for all time. The claim is
about what it means to belong at nation N at a particular moment in history.
3 I have discussed these cases in ‘Debatable Lands’, International Theory, 6 (2014), 104–21,
4 I have done so in ‘Democracy’s Domain’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37 (2009), 201–228.
Response by Bernard Yack
Let me begin by thanking ASEN for organising this event. Like all students of
nationalism I am very grateful to ASEN for the scholarship that it has inspired
and nurtured over the years. Now I owe the Association a more personal debt
for arranging to have two such distinguished scholars discuss my work. It is
especially satisfying to have Professor Miller here, since his pioneering work
on nationalism has been so important for political theorists like myself. My
first paper on the subject, twenty years ago or so, was subtitled ‘A Political
Theorist Looks at the Nation,’so rare was it at the time for political theorists
to tackle the issue. Soon after that, however, Professor Miller’s first book on
nationalism appeared and I had to change my tune. For that book did not just
look at the nation, it enlightened us, thereby encouraging other political
theorists to dive into what seemed to many of us like deep and murky waters.
I shall begin with Professor Miller’s comments, which are framed as a
response to the challenge I pose ‘from the inside’, as he puts it, to liberal
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nationalists like himself. Miller is certainly right to suggest that my book raises
serious questions about many of the most familiar claims made by liberal
nationalists. I am not sure, however, that it is as much a challenge to his own
version of liberal nationalism as he does.
The book poses two main challenges to liberal nationalists. The first, which
Professor Miller does not mention, is that liberal nationalists need to be more
aware that they are playing with fire. Nationalism, I argue, gains its distinctive
character as a social force from a volatile mixture of beliefs about justice and
feelings of communal loyalty, a mixture that tends to intensify hostility to
opponents and erode moral constraints on how we deal with them. It therefore
creates moral problems for anyone who relies on it, no matter how liberal their
convictions. In other words, with nationalist passions ‘you don’t have to be a
fanatic to act like one’ (Yack 2012: 216).
The second challenge my book poses to liberal nationalists involves the idea
of national self-determination, which Miller suggests I judge to be incoherent.
I’d like to correct that impression. It is the idea of a right to national self-
determination that I believe is incoherent, not the idea of national self-
determination itself. The right to national self-determination, I argue in
Chapter Ten, rests on the assertion of two rights that cannot be combined: the
right to form political associations that reflect our subjective sense of connec-
tion to each other and the right to assert control over the territories that we
inhabit. The right to form political associations with co-nationals challenges
what it portrays as the arbitrariness of the given distribution of populations
and territories among states. And the right to control the territory that we
inhabit, a right established by the principle of popular sovereignty, assumes a
given, if morally arbitrary distribution of populations and territories among
states. Assert one right and you effectively undermine the other. You can grant
groups the right to dissolve the given boundaries of states to form their own
political communities. Or you can grant them the right to control the territory
within the given boundaries of the states within which they reside. But you
cannot do both together. You cannot give groups the right to challenge and
correct both communal and territorial divisions. Such is the antinomy of
collective self-determination, as I call it (Yack 2012: 244).
This argument certainly challenges many versions of liberal nationalism,
since the idea of a general right to national self-determination is probably
liberalism’s most influential and, to my mind, disastrous contribution to
nationalist theory and practice. It does not, however, seem to me to be that
much of a challenge to Professor Miller’s version, since, as I note in my book,
Miller is one of the few liberal nationalists who steers clear of this idea (Yack
2012: 235n9). Indeed, he cautions us that while it makes sense to treat national
self-determination as a good, it would be a mistake to turn it into a right.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Miller believes that the difference between
national and political definitions of territory is less problematic than I do. He
agrees with me that it is possible for more than one nation to think of the same
territory as its own. But he thinks that such cases are relatively rare, that the
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overlapping visions of territory that help define, say, the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict represent outliers rather than paradigmatic cases. Needless to say, I
think that such cases are much more frequent, particularly in Eastern Europe
– where they have been discussed with great insight in an important but, too
little known essay by the Hungarian scholar Istvan Bibo (1991). Miller sug-
gests that national communities rarely claim territories beyond those where
they have settled and are in the majority, even when such territories figure
prominently in their cultural heritage. Do the Turks, he asks, now claim
Vienna, whose conquest was the object of such striving for the Ottoman
Empire at its height? Certainly not. But what about the Greeks and Constan-
tinople? They may no longer be claiming it, but only because their earlier
efforts to recover it – thereby completing the “great idea” of Greek national-
ism – ended so disastrously with the expulsion of Greek minorities from the
Turkish state. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is probably not paradigmatic,
but it is not extraordinary. It may seem so only because so many of the violent
upheavals that have accidentally or purposely unmingled populations and
consolidated territories took place in a more distant past. Most west European
countries experienced these upheavals long enough ago that their inhabitants
rarely share overlapping visions of national homes. But imagine, say, a differ-
ent history in which the English forces had not been defeated so badly in the
Hundred Years War. The Dordogne might then figure in the British imagina-
tion as something more than a land of vacation homes. Most west European
nationalisms developed in relatively fortunate circumstances, after consider-
able territorial sorting and cultural consolidation had taken place, thereby
making the overlapping visions of national territory prominent elsewhere seem
anomalous.
The other major point made by Professor Miller focuses on national loyalty
and belonging. Here he seems to suggest that I am making things too easy for
liberals, rather than too hard. He argues that I am making national belonging
too loose, too subject to picking and choosing among the elements that make
up the cultural heritage that defines a nation. On this point, we do indeed
differ, since I make a considerable effort to show that a sense of national
community is not nearly as constraining as it ordinarily is thought to be.
The reason for the difference lies in the relatively unusual understanding of
national community introduced in my book. It argues that it is shared cultural
heritage, rather than shared cultural community, that defines a nation. In other
words, it suggests it is not the sharing of any particular practice or belief or
monumentalised memory that makes a nation, but rather the sharing of a
cultural inheritance, an inconsistent and contingently assembled package of
cultural artifacts. Some parts of that package are celebrated, others are
ignored until pulled out of the closet at convenient times, like lowland Scots
discovering a newfound taste for wearing kilts. But you don’t have to speak
Gaelic, or even like it, to be an Irishman or woman, just as you don’t have to
practice or even like Judaism to be part of a Jewish nation, as opposed to a
Jewish religious community. What you need, instead, is to affirm your sense of
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connection to people who share with you, among other things, a cultural
inheritance that includes the speaking of Gaelic or the practice of Judaism
(Yack 2012: 69).
So my refined American in Paris may possess polished manners and perfect
French. But she is not part of a French national community because of the way
in which she acquired her cultural capacities. For she pursued these capacities
as an expression of an especially attractive and choice-worthy culture, rather
than came by them as part of an inheritance that she happened to share with
others during her formative years. It is therefore relatively easy for her to
disregard all of the distasteful things that might be collected in a French
cultural heritage, which in her imagination consists of great achievements like
the art of Poussin and the language of Proust. Indeed, she might found or join
a society devoted to the preservation of the pure form of French culture that
she loves. But such a society would be an international association for the
salvation of Francophone culture, not a national community. It would bring
together people from around the world who share a belief in the special value
of the French cultural heritage. (Francophiles of the world unite, you have
nothing to lose but your Big Macs!) And those people, no doubt, would
include many French men and women. But what makes the latter French, i.e.
members of a French national community, is not their belief in the special
value of the best elements of the French cultural heritage, something that they
may share with Francophiles around the world. It is rather the sense of mutual
concern and loyalty that they share with others who have inherited that
peculiar package of cultural artifacts, many of whom will be indifferent to the
cultural achievements that most excite the cosmopolitan community of
Francophiles.
If it is cultural heritage rather than cultural belief or practice that is the
focus of national membership, then national community leaves liberals a lot
more room to manoeuver than is commonly thought to be the case. If no
particular belief or practice is entailed by national membership, then national
community is not the threat to individual autonomy it is often said to be. Nor
need it threaten the kind of cultural pluralism that liberals generally prize.
Miller challenges this claim, suggesting that there must be some basic
foundational beliefs, commitments or affinities that every member of a nation
must accept. An American who ridiculed the Founding or a Brit who laughed
at ‘their finest hour’ during the Blitz, he insists, would find no place in their
respective national communities. I disagree. Leave aside, for the moment, the
many Americans who have felt quite comfortable ridiculing the Founding or
unmasking it as an oligarchic swindle. Since I am in London now, I can’t help
focusing on the Blitz. I recall, in particular, a British film of 25 years ago, John
Boorman’s Hope and Glory, that set out to slay that particular sacred cow. It
was quite controversial at the time, even back in my home town of Toronto, let
alone among the legions of Churchill idolators who occupy the more conserva-
tive regions of the American academy. It seems to me, however, that no matter
how controversial it may be, this kind of slaying of sacred cows is usually
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performed from within a national community, rather than from without. It is
usually addressed to people to whom its authors feel connected by the shared
legacy that they are criticising. It is time, they seem to be telling their country-
men, to put this story back in the closet and focus on other things that we
share. We are making ourselves look ridiculous, they are saying, by continuing
to monumentalise our ancestors in this way.
That said, I do not want to suggest that it is easy for liberals to distance
themselves from beliefs or rituals that are widely shared by other members of
their national communities. Liberals, like everyone else, share a sense of
mutual concern and loyalty that connects them to other members of their
communities. To reject things that the other members feel deeply about is
bound to expose them to charges of disloyalty and unconcern, as well as pain
them for the way in which that they are hurting people whose well-being
concerns them. So while there is considerable room for liberals to define
themselves within national communities, doing so often has considerable
psychic and material costs.
Let me turn now to the questions raised by Professor Kukathas in his
insightful comments. His response focuses on two important issues discussed
in the book: the reasons for the intensification of communal conflict in modern
politics and the value of liberal understandings of political sovereignty in the
struggle against arbitrary power. The first of these issues is central to my
account of the nature and sources of nationalism in the first part of the book.
The second comes up near the end of the book as part of an argument about
what might be lost in the solutions offered by cosmopolitan democrats to the
moral problems created by the rise of nationalism.
With regard to the first issue, Professor Kukathas suggests that I rely too
heavily on the moral psychology of communal identity in explaining the
extraordinary intensification of communal conflict in modern political life.
Instead, he suggests that we should be focusing our attention on the political
entrepreneurs who have learned how to mobilise national loyalties as means to
their own ends. They are the ones who inflate national ties – which we both
agree is a partial loyalty compatible with other overlapping ties – into a total
identity that demands the abandonment of all competing loyalties and moral
restraints. They are the ones who turn differences in cultural heritage into
violent passions. For Kukathas, then, it is an external factor that makes
nationalism a volatile social force, the search for political power rather than
cultural difference.
I agree with Professor Kukathas that cultural difference is not a sufficient
explanation for the intensification of communal conflict in modern politics.
The Serbs who declare that they cannot stand ‘breathing the same air as Croats
(Semelin 2009: 29)’ are not expressing an inability to deal with difference. After
all, they would probably have no difficulty sharing a meal – let alone their
oxygen – with an American or Swede or any of a number of “others” whose
differences go way beyond those found among their Croat neighbors. It is
indignation at the wrongs that they ascribe to Croats that fuels their passion,
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not the relatively minor cultural differences that distinguish them from their
neighbors.
The great moral problem created by the spread of nationalism is that it
promotes the belief that we are entitled to pursue national self-determination
without interference from our neighbors and then regularly puts us in situa-
tions in which some of our neighbors are bound to contest that right. No
doubt, we can find situations in which distaste for cultural difference becomes
so intense that it inspires people to think of their communal rivals as unjust,
depraved or inhuman. But the rise of nationalism eliminates the need for such
an intense reaction against cultural difference. For it turns the inclination of
outsiders to oppose our efforts to gain control of our political fate into a
manifestation of unjust or depraved character. Mere concern about the impact
of our actions on their compatriots’ well-being comes to be seen, in itself, as
something dishonest and subversive. In this way, even the smallest differences
can support intense conflicts – not because we narcissistically obsess about the
relatively small points of distinction between us and our rivals, but because our
beliefs about national self-determination encourage us to identify these minor
differences with the line between right and wrong.
This is the moral psychology that I believe we need to understand in order
to make sense of and address the conflicts that nationalism fuels. No doubt, we
need to understand and keep track of the ideologists and opportunists who
have figured out how to mobilise nationalist sentiments to serve their own
purposes. But we also need to understand what allows them to mobilise such
powerful passions so easily. Many of them, after all, are not especially talented
or charismatic as demagogues. But the moral psychology of nationalism, with
its mutually reinforcing mixture of moral conviction and communal feeling,
gives them access to something that is extraordinarily effective in fanning
relatively weak convictions or wan feelings into powerful passions. For nation-
alism, as Margaret Canovan has suggested, works like a battery: a cheap and
mobile source of collective energy that can be harnessed to an extraordinary
variety of causes (Canovan 1996: 73–4). All modern regimes, liberal or totali-
tarian, have drawn on this source of energy because it costs so much less to
produce than most other means of mobilising and coordinating collective
efforts.
The second issue raised by Professor Kukathas departs a bit from the
questions about nationalism that have served as the focus for our discussion
here. It concerns his reservations about the way in which I defend liberal
understandings of sovereignty against defenders of cosmopolitan democracy.
In that defense I suggest that cosmopolitan democrats are too quick to cel-
ebrate the supposed demise of the internal sovereignty of states. The end of
state sovereignty might, as they argue, lead to a form of global governance that
allows us to attack problems at the local, trans-national or universal levels at
which they arise, unimpeded by the interference of states with their claims to
a monopoly of authority within particular territories. But this kind of plural-
ism, I suggest, would risk re-introducing some of the problems of arbitrariness
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and lack of accountability that modern conceptions of sovereignty were devel-
oped to overcome. In other words, slaying the lion of state sovereignty could
return us to an uncertain struggle for pre-eminence among the ‘jackals and
polecats’ who dominate the different and competing centers of power that
constitute global governance (Yack 2012: 281). Without state sovereignty’s
singular, hierarchically structured system of political authority it is difficult, if
not impossible, to identify the specific and limited powers of the people who
govern us.
Of course, a singular, hierarchically structured system of political authority
can be a scary thing, especially if it must be capped, as Hobbes and Bodin
insisted, by an institution whose power is absolute and unlimited. So in
Chapter 11 of the book I discuss the way in which liberals like Locke and
Sieyès tamed the lion of state sovereignty, reserving the unlimited power that
anchors it for ‘the people’ who constitute the state and denying that power to
any group or individual who exercises the limited offices of government so
constituted. This is the solution that Professor Kukathas suggests I view as ‘the
best of all possible worlds’. Hardly that. This is a partial and tenuous solution
to the problem of absolutism and arbitrariness, a solution that rests on some-
thing that we have no right to expect: that we be inclined to imagine the people
as a group that is unlimited in its power to constitute governments but unable
to exercise the power that it constitutes. Or, in the dismissive words of Joseph
de Maistre, that we think of the people as a ‘sovereign who cannot exercise
sovereignty (de Maistre 1996: 1).’ No, this is not the best of all possible worlds.
It just happens at this time to be workable as a way of offering us some
protection against arbitrariness, as well as absolutism. There may be other
ways of offering us this kind of protection. Indeed, cosmopolitan democrats
may discover them in the future and they may turn out to be just as workable.
But, at the moment, I do not see them addressing the problem, since they do
not see the value in the kind of sovereignty that they are urging us to cast onto
the dust heap of history.
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